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Flying Geese and Supply Chain Trade 
1. INTRODUCTION 
On 11 December 2001, China officially became the 143rd member of the WTO. The event marked a milestone in the 
country’s economy, officially ending more than five decades of isolationism. By 2005 China had established itself as 
one of the major players in the world trade system. Less than ten years later, China was already a world champion in 
the export of high-tech products. 
The enormous success of the Chinese trade policy is closely linked to China’s policy towards foreign direct investment 
(FDI)1. The first foreign investors entered the country in 1979. In 1980, four special economic zones were created in 
Zhuhai, Xiamen, Shenzhen, and Shantou with the aim of increasing foreign investment flows. In 1984 the country 
launched a policy to open 14 coastal cities and three regions as “open areas” for foreign investment with significant 
tax benefits and much less red tape. These policy changes came about at a time when the world trade system was 
experiencing the emergence of supply chain trade, or what Richard Baldwin (2011) called “globalization’s second 
unbundling”. Thanks to lower transportation and coordination costs, firms are now able to minimize costs by 
fragmenting production and distributing tasks around the world. This new paradigm of trade has been instrumental in 
China’s success story.  
Supply chain trade, outsourcing, and offshoring are all terms that have been used in the past to describe the 
phenomenon of firms spreading facilities across the world, each unit specializing in those parts of the final product that 
are cheaper to produce at each specific location (Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg, 2008; Deardorf, 2001). Abundance of 
unskilled labor makes developing countries attractive locations for low-skill tasks, while industrial nations are attractive 
locations for design and other high-knowledge tasks. Because production networks tend to be regional, this 
reorganization of production is usually referred to as “factory Asia”, “factory Europe” or “factory America”.   
Product fragmentation enables developing countries to jump stages and move directly from low-skilled manufacturing 
to exporting highly sophisticated goods. The process can be extremely quick: Nowadays, developing countries can 
climb up the technological ladder without the hassle of having to adapt foreign technologies, let alone develop their 
own; it suffices to attract foreign firms with foreign knowledge and foreign technologies to jumpstart new production 
ventures (Baldwin, 2011). However, as Baldwin pointed out, with supply chain trade the new technology arriving in 
developing countries is lent technology. In other words, it is technology that belongs to multinational firms (MNFs), 
embedded in their plants, and it may never be transferred to the host country. Indeed, MNFs are likely to have a 
strong interest in keeping knowledge at home and may actually endeavor to block any possible transfer.  
This characteristic of supply chain trade makes Chinese export-led growth radically different from export-led growth as 
pursued by Japan or Korean in the past. The path followed by Japan or Korea relied on these countries’ ability to 
adopt and adapt foreign technologies. Copy, adapt, and innovate, that was the recipe. In the case of China, 
technology is rooted in plants attracted to the country by China’s low labor costs. As Chinese wages rise, as is already 
1 For the relationship between FDI and trade in China, see (Branstetter & Lardy, 2006). 
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happening, will these firms stay in the country or will they leave, with the same ease with which they came, to other 
low labor cost locations such as nearby Vietnam or Cambodia, leaving behind empty buildings and not much more? 
The initial ascent up the technological ladder on the broad shoulders of MNFs may be an easy task; to keep them on 
your side as you climb up the ladder may be another story. 
 If China is indeed moving up the technological ladder, pulling behind it poorer nations, supply chain trade would be 
simply strengthening the well-known Asian flying geese pattern of growth, whereby the production of manufactures 
continuously move from the more to the less advanced nations in the region in response to changes in national 
comparative advantages. However, if MNFs move from country to country leaving behind little in terms of 
technological advances, supply chain trade could be turning the flying geese pattern of growth into something more 
resembling a game of musical chairs. The big question for Asian nations today is whether supply chain trade and the 
Asian flying geese pattern of growth are in fact compatible.   
This paper aims to shed some light on this question. To this end, it analyzes changes in the bilateral trade flows of 
China and the other ASEAN+3 countries in the last two decades and relates them to changes in the division of labor 
in factory Asia. The paper contributes to the growing literature on supply chain trade by offering a proxy for production 
integration based on estimations of the revealed comparative advantages of these countries. With this indicator the 
paper offers some evidence of how Factory Asia is evolving.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the second section covers the changing patterns of Chinese bilateral 
trade flows in end and intermediate goods since 2000. Section  3 discusses production integration in factory Asia with 
the help of an indicator of revealed comparative advantages complemented with an analysis of the comparative 
advantages implied in the countries per capita income levels.. Conclusions are provided in Section 4. 
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2. CHINA’S PATTERNS OF TRADE OF 2000-2012 
Data 
Data on bilateral trade flows are taken from COMTRADE. Trade flows in intermediate goods and end-products are 
identified with the United Nations “Broad Economic Categories” (BEC) classification. The BEC classification regroups 
exports according to final use, distinguishing between products for final consumption and products for industrial use. 
This regrouping necessarily involves some subjective judgment, and the use of the BEC data to estimate supply chain 
trade has not been free from criticism (see, for example (de Backer & Yamano, 2011)). In particular, BEC is suspected 
of underestimating the actual size of intra-industry trade. Better measures of the actual size of trade in inputs may be 
achieved using the World Output Input database, which provides I-O matrixes for all OECD countries and a number of 
other nations including China, Japan, and Korea. For other Asian countries, I-O tables are compiled by the Institute of 
Developing Economies IDE-Jetro. Unfortunately, most of the poorer ASEAN+3 countries are not included in either of 
these databases. Favoring coverage over precision, I decided to stick to the BEC classification without further data 
transformations. Despite its drawbacks, this approach gives a clear picture of the position of the different ASEAN 
countries within factory Asia and, more importantly, of how these nations have moved up or down the supply chain in 
the last decades.  
Changing Patterns of Trade Between China and the ASEAN+3 Countries 
Fig. 1 shows the evolution of total Chinese exports and imports of intermediate products since 2000. If all intermediate 
goods were used in the production of exports, the distance between total exports and imports of intermediates could 
be read as a rough measure of the content of Chinese value added in total Chinese exports. If some of the 
intermediates were used in the production of goods for the domestic market, this measure would underestimate the 
real domestic value added of exports. Thus it seems legitimate to claim that distance between total exports and 
imports of intermediates approximates the minimum size of the domestic content of total Chinese exports. As Fig. 1 
shows, during the first half of this century the content of Chinese value added in total Chinese exports was very low. 
The low contribution of Chinese work in total Chinese exports reflects the fact that most of the country’s exports at the 
time were assembled products. Starting in the early 2000s, the first foreign investors - mostly from the United States 
and Japan - moved into the country with the intension of using China as an assembly platform for re-exports2. 
Intermediate goods, largely imported from Japan and the USA, were brought into the country, assembled there using 
cheap Chinese labor, and re-exported later-on to the firms’ home countries and other nations.  
However, as the graph shows, over the last few years the distance between total exports and intermediate imports 
has been growing steadily. Clearly, the content of Chinese value added in total Chinese exports has been constantly 
increasing since around 2005. What these figures suggest is that firms that were importing most of their inputs from 
2 FDI flourished in China before the 2000s, when many foreign firms entered the country lured by its growing domestic 
market. The 1990s FDI boom was short-lived and many of these firms left the country after a few years. This period is 
largely ignored here since this paper mainly focuses on supply chain trade. FDI for exports started only after China 
joined the WTO in 2001. Thus, first movers in this paper are first after WTO accession. A comprehensive description 
of how FDI evolved in China pre- and post-WTO accession can be found in (Branstetter & Lardy, 2006). 
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other nations by the early 2000s had started to produce some components in China by the mid-2000s or were joined 
there by new entrants that had decided to produce in situ at least some intermediate inputs from the start. 
Figure 1: Chinese Trade Flows of 2000-2012, in Billion USD 
 
Source: COMTRADE 
This fast shift away from the pure assemblage of products into the production of some intermediates shows both 
China’s ability to join factory Asia and the speed at which firms in the region can react to changing conditions. A very 
rapid learning process, both in China and among foreign firms, must have resulted in a fall of production costs large 
enough to enable firms - either old firms or new entrants - to move the production of at least some components to 
China and reap further gains from relocation in just a few years3. (Further evidence that this was the case is 
presented later). In other words, the increasing content of Chinese value added in total Chinese exports suggests the 
rapid ascent of China along the supply chain.  
As the process of integration advanced, China’s trade relations with industrial nations and with other regional nations 
also changed. By 1990, half of total Chinese exports went to four countries: Japan, the United States, Korea, and 
Germany. By 2012, these countries accounted for just 35% of total exports. Among the new destinations for Chinese 
exports, regional partners such as India, Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam stand out (Fig. 2).  
At the same time, total Chinese imports grew an astonishing 3,200%, jumping from US $53 billion in 1990 to US$1.76 
trillion in 2012, excluding fuels. Most of this growth went to regional partners. Korea, a minor source of imports two 
decades ago, is today the second source of Chinese imports after Japan, replacing the USA. Other regional partners 
such as India, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia each account for more than 2% of total imports in 2012; two 
decades ago, China’s imports from these countries had been nonexistent. 
China’s exports to industrial countries (within and outside of the region) consist mostly of end products whereas 
Chinese imports from these countries are mostly of intermediate goods (see Table 1). This is the kind of trade 
3 For theoretical links between production costs in host countries and FDI and vertical integration, see (Grossman, et 
al., 2006; Helpman, 2006) 
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structure that one would expect from a country whose comparative advantages rely on very cheap labor. And it is 
indeed the kind of trade structure that dominated Chinese trade flows at the beginning of the 2000s when assemblage 
was the norm.  
But China’s bilateral trade flows with Korea, another industrial nation, are remarkably different. In the case of Sino-
Korean import and export flows, intermediate goods clearly dominate. It is likely that the difference in Sino-Korean 
bilateral trade flows corresponds to a different entry strategy of Korean firms in China, which could be explained by a 
lucky combination of a ‘cheaper’ entry-time and lower distance costs. Korean firms started a massive ‘invasion’ into 
China only in the early 2000s (Yoon, 2007). These firms faced lower costs than their American and Japanese 
counterparts largely because they could profit from the Chinese learning process that had taken place since the early 
1990s. Thus, as opposed to Japanese and especially American firms, Korean firms did not use China merely as an 
assembly plant but could relocate to China the production of intermediate goods from the start. Growth of trade 
between these two partners has been astonishing: Trade between the two countries was non-existent before 1987, 
when Sino-Korean diplomatic relations were re-established; by 2004, China was Korea’s main trading partner. The 
kind of production integration suggested by this trade data is one in which China is no longer at the lowest step in the 
ladder but rather somewhere in the middle. 
Trade flows between China and developing Asian countries further support this hypothesis. Intermediate goods 
represented more than 60% of Chinese imports and exports from Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, or the Philippines 
(see Table 1). The figures are impressive: By 2012, imports of intermediates from these countries accounted for 9% of 
total intermediate imports (see Table 2). It seems that China is importing some sophisticated inputs from Japan and 
Korea, and also some less sophisticated intermediates from developing Asian countries. This is what countries in the 
middle of a supply chain do.  
All these data strongly suggest that the rapid growth of intraregional trade in Asia actually reflects the advance of 
production fragmentation in the region and the re-location of different production tasks across these countries.  
 
6 
 
Flying Geese and Supply Chain Trade 
 
  
17% 
9% 
5% 
4% 
3% 
3% 
3% 
3% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
United States
Japan
Korea, Rep.
Germany
India
Netherlands
Russian Federation
United Kingdom
Australia
Other Asia, nes
Malaysia
Singapore
Indonesia
Brazil
Thailand
United Arab Emirates
Canada
Mexico
Italy
Vietnam
France
0% 5% 10% 15% 20%
Exports 2012 
26% 
12% 
6% 
6% 
6% 
5% 
3% 
3% 
3% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
Japan
United States
Russian Federation
Germany
Singapore
Korea, Rep.
Thailand
Netherlands
Italy
United Kingdom
France
Macao
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
Exports 1990 
21% 
14% 
7% 
7% 
6% 
4% 
4% 
4% 
3% 
3% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
Japan
United States
Other Asia, nes
Russian Federation
Germany
Australia
Canada
France
United Kingdom
Italy
Malaysia
Korea, Rep.
Indonesia
Brazil
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
Imports 1990 
13% 
11% 
9% 
8% 
7% 
6% 
4% 
4% 
3% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
Japan
Korea, Rep.
Other Asia, nes
United States
Australia
Germany
Brazil
Malaysia
Thailand
Chile
India
Indonesia
Canada
Singapore
France
Russian Federation
0% 5% 10% 15%
Imports 2012 
Figure 2: China - Bilateral Trade Flows by Partner Country,  
(flows > than 2% of Total) 
Source: Comtrade 
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Table 1: Share of Intermediate and Final Products in Total Bilateral Exports and Imports. China and Selected 
Partners in 1990, 2000, and 2012 
  
  Interm Final Interm Final Interm Final Interm Final 
  Germany Japan United States South Korea 
 
Exports 
 
1990 55% 45% 58% 42% 26% 74% 92% 8% 
2000 40% 60% 39% 61% 24% 76% 72% 28% 
2012 41% 59% 46% 54% 28% 72% 66% 34% 
           
 
Imports 
 
1990 56% 44% 80% 20% 71% 29% 95% 5% 
2000 64% 36% 80% 20% 61% 39% 92% 8% 
2012 53% 47% 74% 26% 66% 34% 80% 20% 
  Vietnam Indonesia Malaysia Philippines 
Exports 1990 77% 23% 70% 30% 73% 27% 85% 15% 
2000 78% 22% 67% 33% 61% 39% 72% 28% 
2012 56% 44% 66% 34% 58% 42% 68% 32% 
          
Imports 1990 70% 30% 100% 0% 98% 2% 94% 6% 
2000 73% 27% 96% 4% 88% 12% 80% 20% 
2012 57% 43% 89% 11% 89% 11% 67% 33% 
  Brunei Cambodia Myanmar  
Exports 1990 94% 6% 56% 44% 78% 22%   
2000 65% 35% 82% 18% 70% 30%   
2012 39% 61% 78% 22% 73% 27%   
          
Imports 1990 __ __ 100% 0% 81% 19%   
2000 0% 100% 97% 3% 77% 23%   
2012 99% 1% 46% 54% 81% 19%   
Source: COMTRADE and author’s calculations 
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Table 2: Chinese Trade in Intermediate Goods, Selected Partners in 1990 and 2012 (% of Total) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This of course would imply that as wages in China rose some jobs migrated from this country to other, low-labor-cost 
neighbors. Anecdotal evidence would support this hypothesis. According to different reports, South Korean companies 
are leaving China, attracted by cheaper labor in poorer Asian countries. “There used to be over 10,000 Korean 
companies in Shandong, but this has now decreased to 4,800, 2,200 of which are located in Shandong's capital 
Qingdao. (…) Korean businesses in industries including textiles, shoes, and jewellery have moved to Southeast Asian 
countries such as Vietnam and Myanmar” (ChinaTimes, 11.20.2014).   
And not only Korean and Japanese firms are moving to lower income countries. Total Chinese FDI outflows totaled 
near 88 billion USD in 2013, up from less than 3 billion USD in 2003. 7% of this figure went to South-East Asian 
countries as shown in Fig. 3. From the point of view of the recipient countries, total Chinese FDI may not be very 
large, but in some cases it is not negligible. That clearly is the case of Vietnam, where total Chinese FDI flows, 
excluding FDI from Hong-Kong, was 5% of total flows in 2011 (see Fig. 4). 
  
Imports Exports 
 1990 2012  1990 2012 
Japan 24% 16% United States 6% 10% 
Korea, Rep. 3% 15% Japan 22% 9% 
United States 10% 6% Korea, Rep. 7% 7% 
Germany 5% 5% India 1% 5% 
Malaysia 2% 5% Germany 6% 3% 
Thailand 1% 3% Indonesia 1% 3% 
Singapore 1% 2% Thailand 5% 3% 
Indonesia 3% 2% Malaysia 2% 3% 
Philippines 0% 1% Singapore 6% 2% 
Vietnam 0% 1% Vietnam 0% 2% 
   Philippines 1% 1% 
   Myanmar 1% 1% 
   Pakistan 2% 1% 
Source: Comtrade 
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Figure 4: FDI Flows in Vietnam by Geographical Origin (in Million USD) 
 
 
This is exactly what development following the well-known flying geese formation should look like: as China’s 
comparative advantages move away from cheap labor, the production of labor intensive manufactures (or tasks) is 
moving to countries with cheaper labor such as Vietnam. The fact that most of the firms moving production to 
Vietnam, Myanmar, or Indonesia are likely to be Korean or Japanese rather that Chinese has no bearing on the final 
effect.  
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Figure 3: China, FDI Outflows to South-East Asia, 2013 
 
Source: UNCTAD 
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Or has it? One apparent difference between the current situation and the path previously followed by Japan and 
Korea is the speed at which changes are taking place now. Justin Yifu Lin, former World Bank Chief Economist, 
reckons that China will have to shed 85 million manufacturing jobs in the coming years because of fast-rising wages 
for unskilled workers (Lin, 2011). This is an enormous opportunity for the poorer ASEAN countries and a huge 
challenge for China: Korea had forty years before it had to face the heavy competition of China; China had much less 
time before the arrival of Vietnam.  
What will remain in China once the Korean and Japanese firms that drove growth in the past have left? Are MNFs 
moving from poor country to poor country leaving behind them just wreckage? Or will these countries be able to 
create new comparative advantages to remain competitive despite these shorter windows of opportunity? To 
approach this question, the next section proposes an index that illustrates the changes in the positions held by the 
different ASEAN countries within factory Asia in the last decade.  
3. REVEALED COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES, TECHNOLOGICAL SOPHISTICATION, AND PRODUCTION 
FRAGMENTATION  
Methodological Considerations 
The Heckscher Olin (H-O) model of trade predicts that countries would specialize in the production of those goods 
that intensively use the factors of production with which they are better endowed. Thus countries where unskilled labor 
is abundant would tend to export unskilled-labor-intensive goods whereas countries where knowledge and technology 
are abundant will export high-tech goods. This theoretical linkage between specialization and factor endowment has 
been used in the past to derive from trade statistic conclusions about factor endowments and comparative 
advantages. For instance, if a country had a large share of total world exports of high-tech products, analysts felt 
confident to assume that that country was richly endowed with skilled labor and technology. In other words, the implicit 
assumption was that gross trade flows were a good approximation of comparative advantages. Given the availability 
of trade data, different indicators of Revealed Comparative Advantages (RCA) were thus constructed (Balassa, 1965; 
Vollrath, 1991).    
However, with production fragmentation measures of comparative advantages based on gross trade flows can be 
misleading. China may be exporting significant amounts of high-tech goods not because it is richly endowed with 
knowledge and technology but because some low-skilled elements of high-tech goods are being produced in China 
and re-exported later embedded in high-tech end products. Since gross trade data do not allow us to identify which 
parts of each good are actually produced in the different countries, the one-to-one link between trade ratios and 
comparative advantages no longer holds.  
One way to solve this problem would be to estimate RCA indicators with value-added trade data rather than with 
gross trade flows. However, as stated at the beginning of this paper, value-added trade flows are not available for 
many of the poor Asian nations.  Instead, the gross trade flows are used here to compute the RCA index but to 
interpret this index as an estimation of production integration in the region rather than as a measure of actual revealed 
comparative advantages.  
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In a second stage, the RCA indexes are aggregated in an index of technological content of revealed comparative 
advantages (TCRCA). The TCRCA index that this paper proposes aggregates the RCA indexes according to the level 
of technological sophistication of the different groups of products.  
In the absence of supply chain trade, the TCRCA index may be read as a ranking of countries according to the level of 
sophistication of their production sectors: Countries with a high TRCA index would be ranked as countries with highly 
sophisticated production sectors whereas countries with low TCRCA would be ranked as low-tech countries. 
However, given the rise of supply chain trade and production fragmentation the interpretation of the TRCA index 
becomes more complex. The TCRCA indexes may indeed be reflecting the level of technological sophistication of the 
production apparatus of a country, i.e., the TCRCA indexes reflect the factor endowments of the country. They may 
also be reflecting the participation of the country in the production of sophisticated goods via the supply of low-tech 
inputs, i.e., the TCRC indexes reflect trade in tasks or supply chain trade.  
To disentangle factor endowments from trade in tasks, the analysis of the TCRCA index is complemented with an 
analysis of the levels of technological sophistication implied by the countries’ per capita income levels. This idea is 
owed to Lall et al. (Lall, et al., 2006). Following their reasoning, countries with lower per capita income are assumed to 
be endowed with abundant unskilled labor4 and low levels of technological development. If the level of technological 
sophistication implied by the TCRCA index does not correspond to the level of technological sophistication consistent 
with the country’s per capita GDP, then the TCRCA index is interpreted as an indicator of production integration rather 
than as an indicator of factor endowments. For example, if a country with low per capita income shows a high TCRCA 
index, the latter is interpreted as an indicator of the country’s position within factory Asia and not as an indirect 
indicator of abundancy of skilled labor and high technology. In a similar way, the correlation between the TCRCA and 
per capita income in the region is interpreted as an indicator of the degree of production fragmentation within factory 
Asia: High correlation indicates little product fragmentation (countries endowed with high-tech factors export high-tech 
goods and vice-versa) whereas low correlation indicates higher product fragmentation. 
This way of using RCA as proxies for production integration has the advantage of allowing the drawing of a “map” of 
production integration based solely on gross trade data. This data is available for all countries in the world.  
  
4 The reasoning goes as follows: If unskilled labor is abundant, a country must embrace technologies that use this 
factor of production intensively, and wages must be low. 
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Data and estimation methodology 
Probably the best-known measure of comparative advantages is the Balassa index of revealed comparative 
advantages (RCA) (Balassa, 1965). The Balassa index is defined as 
(𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋/𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋)
𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋/𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 
where Xij are exports of product j from country I, 
Xi are total exports from country I, 
Xwj are world exports of product j, and 
Xw are total world exports. 
 
In the context of this paper, the Balassa RCA indexes are calculated for exports of manufactures at the 3-digit level of 
disaggregation of the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), Revision 3. Countries are defined as 
specializing in a certain product group if the corresponding RCA index is larger than 1.  
In a second stage, product specialization is related to technological sophistication. To this end, the paper constructs 
an index of the technological content of the revealed comparative advantages (TCRCA). The index, similar to the 
index of technological content proposed by Haltmaier et al. (Haltmaier, et al., 2007), aggregates the RCA indexes 
according to the technological content of the product groups in which each country appears to have a comparative 
advantage5. As is common in the literature, manufactures are grouped according to technological content using Lall’s 
categories (Lall, 2000). The index distinguishes between seven levels of technological content, in ascending order of 
technology intensity:  
1. Labor-intensive and resource intensive manufactures (LT1);  
2. Low-skill and technology-intensive manufactures (LT2);  
3. Automotive (MT1);  
4. Chemicals and basic metal industrial products (MT2); 
5. Engineering products MT3); 
6. Electronics and electrical products (HT1); and 
7. Other high-tech products. 
The product groups assigned to each level of technological content are presented in the appendix in Table A1. 
Summary results of the number product groups in which the different ASEAN+3 countries specialize (product groups 
with RCA>1) per level of technological content in 2000 and 2012 are presented in Tables 2A and 3A in the appendix. 
5 Haltmaier et. al (2007) propose an index of technological content that aggregates total exports rather than the 
number of product groups with RCA>1. With this exception, the methodology used in this paper is the one they 
propose. 
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To construct the TCRCA index, the seven levels of technological content are assigned a value from 1 to 7, where 1 
represents the lowest level of technological content and 7 the highest. The TCRCA index is simply the sum of these 
numbers weighted by the share of each category on the total number of export groups with RCA>1 (the weights can 
be derived from Tables 2A and 3A). The index varies from 1 to 7, with 7 being the highest level of technological 
content. 
The TCRCA Index and Factory Asia 
The TCRCA indexes for the ASEAN+3 countries in 2000 and 2012, plotted against the corresponding incomes per 
capita in log form, are shown in Fig. 4. Inasmuch as GDP per capita reflects factor endowments, the situation the 
graph for 2000 is an almost perfect fit of the H-O model predictions: By the beginning of this century, countries where 
unskilled labor was abundant – and GDP per capita was consequently low - were specializing in products with low 
technological content, whereas countries where unskilled labor was scarce were specializing in high-tech products. 
Differences in income per capita explained 74% of the variation of the TCRCA index. China, in this figure, is located 
very much where it should be, with a TCRCA very close to that of Indonesia and in front of Vietnam.  
 
Figure 5: Index of Technological Content and Income per Capita, ASEAN+3 Countries, in 2000 and 2012 (See 
the appendix for country names and abbreviations)  
 
A decade later, the figures look quite different and, somewhat surprisingly, China does not account for the lion share 
of the difference.  
To begin with, in barely ten years the technological content of the regional comparative advantages moved upwards: 
The median TCRCA in 2000 was 3.22. By 2012, it had climbed to 3.64. More importantly, the regional disparities in 
technological development diminished substantially during these years: The standard deviation of the indexes shrank 
from 1.12 in 2000 to 0.965 in 2012. If we were to judge the 2012 picture with the H-O model in mind, we would expect 
the apparent equalization of technological development to be reflected in a similar trend in terms of income per capita. 
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This, clearly, is not the case. Although all countries in the region grew significantly more than Japan in the last 12 
years, the income levels of the ASEAN countries are still hugely disparate (see Table 3). The impressive catching up 
that is taking place in the region is evident in the table. The income per capita of Cambodia, the poorest country in the 
sample, was one percent of Japanese income per capita in 2000. Barely a decade later, Japanese income per capita 
was ‘only’ 55 times larger than that of Cambodia. Other fast runners have been China, Indonesia, and Vietnam. This 
notwithstanding, income differentials are still huge. And this clearly is not reflected in the technological distance 
between countries. Japan’s TCRCA was four times that of Cambodia in 2000, and only twice as large in 2012. 
According to the TCRCA indicator, there is practically no difference in the technological content of factor endowments 
of Japan and the Philippines, although Japan’s income per capita is 25 times that of the Philippines.   
The link between income per capita and technological development, still strong at the beginning of the century, 
weakened substantially in the last 10 years: Differences in income per capita explained only 54% of the TCRCA 
variation in 2012.  
The weaker correlation between the technological development implied by the TCRCA indexes and the factor 
endowments that may be expected from the incomes per capita of the different countries corresponds to the surge of 
supply chain trade. Within the last decade, countries that were not part of factory Asia entered the picture and began 
to produce some of the labor-intensive inputs that factory Asia needs. This is the case for Vietnam and Indonesia, and 
according to the data presented here also for Cambodia. This is why the technological content of the (gross) exports 
of these countries no longer reflect factor endowments.  
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Table 3: Technological Distance and Income per Capita in Asia 
 
Similarly, the high TCCAs shown by the Philippines, Thailand, or Malaysia do not imply that these countries have 
already caught up with Korea or Japan. The leading dragons in Asia are not Malaysia, Thailand, or the Philippines but 
rather Japanese and Korean firms located in the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia. The technological development 
the index is attributing to these countries should in fact be attributed to those firms and their countries of origin. Or 
better still: The technological content attributed to the 3-digit SITC classification product groups was perhaps a good 
enough approach to the technological development embodied in these products in 2000, but this is no longer true. 
Because production can be fragmented, Vietnam and the Philippines can specialize in the low-tech bits of 
sophisticated products while Japan specializes in the high-tech bits. The 3-digit SITC classification does not capture 
these possibilities. 
While the TCRCA index in 2012 may not be a good picture of H-O type of trade, it is an accurate description of 
production integration in Asia. The figures presented here show the amazing speed at which the process is taking 
place. China’s story is well-known. The country’s growth strategy that favored FDI and export-led growth from the start 
soon placed the country in the middle of factory Asia. Indeed, China’s integration in factory Asia, as reflected in Fig. 5, 
has not changed much over the last 10 years. But production integration is already encompassing many other 
countries. Across the region, the jumps in the TCRCA indexes of the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Cambodia 
suggest that these countries became part of, or increased their links with, factory Asia in a significant way between 
2000 and 2012. The distance between the TCRCA of these countries and Japan shrank by more than the distance 
between China and Japan. What these figures are telling us is that poor nations are being rushed up the technological 
ladder as firms disperse production in search for cheaper labor. As shown above, the impact of the process on the 
income of poor countries has been enormous.  
  
Technological distance between Japan and 
ASEAN countries according to TCRCA 
(TCRCA Japan / TCRCA others) 
 
Catch-up in ASEAN 
Japan’s GDP per capita/ GDP of other 
countries 
 2000 2012 2000 2012 
CHN 1.63 1.53 30 11 
IDN 1.74 1.55 31 21 
KHM 4.13 2.28 103 55 
KOR 1.46 1.17 2 2 
MYS 1.07 1.02 7 5 
PHL 1.37 0.97 32 25 
SGP 0.92 0.88 1 1 
THA 1.43 1.20 15 11 
VNM 2.15 1.80 64 37 
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The other side of the coin of course is the fate of Asia’s leading nations. If, as a result of supply chain trade, poor 
countries are exhibiting growing numbers of comparative advantages in the production of sophisticated products (or of 
parts of these products), then some jobs of the leading nations must be migrating south. Korea is a clear example of 
this. The country, which exhibited comparative advantages in relatively low-tech products in 2000, presents a TCRCA 
index which is much closer to that of Japan in 2012. This change implies a huge re-accommodation of the Korean 
industry. Of course KOTRA had good reasons to cry wolf: Many unskilled jobs must have left the country in favor of 
Chinese and Vietnamese labor markets.  
The same fate of course also awaits new climbers like China. As shown in the first part of the paper, China’s role in 
Asia has changed from assembly platform to that of a down- and up-stream exporter of intermediate goods. China is 
now somewhere in the middle of the supply chain, and newcomers such as Vietnam are climbing the ladder in pursuit. 
As the evolution of the TCRCA indexes shows, they are moving fast.   
Both China and Korea seem to be withstanding the challenge well. Climbing up and staying ahead seems to be 
possible even at high speed as the resilience of these countries has shown so far. However, poorer countries should 
be aware: If they want their MNF to stay put once wages start to rise, they must become attractive in ways that do not 
depend on cheap labor. And judging from the evolution of the TCRCA indexes shown here, the time they will be given 
to stay in the race is very short. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
China’s position within factory Asia has changed rapidly: At the bottom of the supply chain in the early 2000s, China 
today finds itself somewhere in the middle of the technological ladder, importing technologically sophisticated inputs 
from industrial nations and less sophisticated intermediate goods from developing Asia. Furthermore, China appears 
to have graduated from follower goose and is now becoming a leader, pulling along other low-labor-cost countries 
such as Vietnam.  
This looks very much like the old story of the flying geese model of Asian development. But two facts set it apart: The 
technology that is driving the change nowadays does not belong to any country. Technology is rootless, and it can 
change location at incredible speed. As a result, factory Asia is changing rapidly. Production is dispersing fast and the 
links of all countries in the region with factory Asia are getting stronger.  
This process has resulted in rapid increases in per capita GDP and income convergence among the ASEAN 
countries. The speed at which this is happening however will also put strong pressure on Asian countries. With supply 
chain trade, countries are given a very short time to adapt their economies and stay in the race once their wages start 
to increase. Korea had more than 40 years to create new comparative advantages and embrace innovation as an 
engine of growth. China and all other countries will have much less time to do the same. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Country Names and Abbreviations: 
KHM Cambodia 
VNM  Vietnam 
IDN Indonesia 
CHN China 
PHL Philippines 
THA Thailand 
MYS Malaysia 
KOR South Korea 
SGP Singapore 
JPN Japan 
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Table A 1: Product Groups SITC Rev 3, per Level of Manufacturing 
 
The seven categories of technological sophistication are those defined by Lall (2000), who used the SITC Rev. 2 
classification to aggregate manufactures. The correspondence with the SITC Rev. 3 classification is taken from 
Haltmeier et al. (2007). 
LT1 LT2 MT1 MT2 MT3 HT1 HT2 
611 642 781 653 711 773 716 712 
612 665 782 671 713 775 718 792 
613 666 783 672 714 793 751 871 
651 673 784 679 721 812 752 874 
652 674 785 786 722 813 759 881 
654 675  791 723 872 761  
655 676  882 724 873 764  
656 677  883 725 884 771  
657 678   726 885 774  
658 691   727 891 776  
659 692   728  778  
831 693   731    
841 694   733    
842 695   735    
843 696   737    
844 697   741    
845 699   742    
846 811   743    
848 821   744    
851 892   745    
 893   746    
 894   747    
 895   748    
 896   749    
 897   762    
 898   763    
 899   772    
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Table A 2: Number of Product Groups with RCA>1 per Level of Technological Content in 2000  
      
  
 
Table A 3: Number of Product Groups with RCA>1 per Level of Technological Content in 2012 
 
 LT1 LT2 MT1 MT2 MT3 HT1 HT2 
CHN 18 11 1 2 6 7 1 
IDN 11 10 1 3 5 4 0 
JPN 0 8 5 3 17 4 3 
KHM 7 1 1 0 0 0 1 
KOR 3 7 2 2 8 3 1 
MYS 2 7 0 0 6 7 2 
PHL 3 1 1 0 5 6 1 
SGP 0 4 1 0 8 6 3 
THA 7 8 3 3 8 7 1 
VNM 14 8 1 1 2 3 1 
 
  
 LT1 LT2 MT1 MT2 MT3 HT1 HT2 
CHN 18 13 1 4 6 6 2 
IDN 14 10 1 2 4 4 1 
JPN 0 7 4 1 20 7 4 
KHM 7 1 0 0 0 0 0 
KOR 9 7 1 2 7 5 0 
MYS 3 2 0 0 3 6 1 
PHL 6 0 0 0 4 3 0 
SGP 0 2 0 1 6 8 0 
THA 13 7 2 1 10 6 1 
VNM 13 6 1 1 2 2 0 
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